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BAR BRIEFS
sustain the verdict the evidence will be considered only so far as
necessary to determine whether the trial court acted within its discre-
tion, and where no abuse of discretion is shown the action of the trial
court will not be disturbed.
-0-
Village of Reeder vs. Hanson. In condemnation action instituted
by the Village of Reeder to condemn land belonging to defendant "for
street purposes and for public grounds", the jury fixed the value of
the land and the trial court ordered judgment for plaintiff. Defendant
challenged plaintiff's right to maintain the action for the reason that
no resolution, determining the public necessity for laying out the
street before in*stituting action to condemn land had been published.
HELD: i. It is not necessary for city to publish resolution determin-
ing necessity for laying out street before commencing action; 2. De-
fendant had waived the objection because he did not object until after
commencement of trial, and then made only a general objection to the
jurisdiction of the court; 3. After the village had organized a park dis-
trict, as provided by law, only park commissioners have the right to
condemn for "public purposes". The board of Village trustees had
no right to condemn for such purpose. New trial ordered.
0
Baird as Receiver vs. Abraham. Action to recover on a promis-
sory note given by defendant to Farmers Bank of Minot as part of a
transaction in which he agreed to purchase capital stock in the Savings,
Loan and Trust Co. of Minot. Defendant assigned, in writing, said
capital stock to the Bank as security for the note in question. The
officers of the Savings, Loan and Trust Co. and the Farmers Bank
were the same persons, and the Farmers Bank falsely represented to
defendant that the Savings Company was a solvent corporation, which
representations the defendant relied upon. The stock of the Savings
Company was actually worthless and was never delivered to the defend-
ant. Defendant's plea was lack of consideration. The case was tried
by the court without a jury, the court making findings in favor of the
defendant. HELD: A case, properly triable by a jury, but tried by
the court without a jury, is not triable anew in the Supreme Court.
The findings of fact are presumed to be correct and appellant has the
burden of showing that they are contrary to -the evidence. In the
instant case the facts found by the trial court, that the note was without
consideration, are supported by the evidence.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DECISIONS
Where third party is liable for injury employee may apply for
compensation or proceed against third party by suit. He can not do
both.-Rasmusset vs. George Benz & Sons, 212 N. W. 20 (Minn.
Jan. 1927).
0-
Dependent of deceased workman claiming under compensation act
can not deny right to have autopsy of body where the cause of death
is obscure or disputed.-Battle Creek Coal & Coke Co. vs. Martin, 290
S. W. 18 (Tenn. Jan. 1927).
0
Refusal of the Industrial Accident Board to allow a lump sum
should be reversed only for strong and urgent reasons, because the
intent of compensation acts is to safeguard the award.-Kaylor vs. Cal-
lahan Zinc - Lead Co., 253 Pac. 132 (Idaho Jan. 1927).
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Provision in compensation law permitting the allowance of attor-
ney fees in favor of claimant in cases where employer fails to comply
with the law is constitutional and appropriate for the enforcement of
the act.- Marshall vs. Foote, 252 Pac. 1075 (Cal. Jan. 1927).
0
Employee, suffering broken arm, who is not thereby disabled from
work but continues to perform his duties and receive full pay therefor,
is not entitled to compensation for the reason that he has not been
disabled within the intent of the law.-Lumbermen's Reciprocal'Asso-
ciation vs. Coody, 278 S. W. 856 (Texas Jan. 1927).
-0-
An employer who stipulated that claimant was entitled to com-
pensation for injuries is estopped later, upon supplemental application
of employee for additional hospital and medical care, to defend upon
the ground that injury was not incurred in the course of employ-
ment but while playing baseball.- Coombs vs. Industrial Commission,
252 Pac. 1o69 (Cal. Jan. 1927).
-0-
An engineer quit his employment and returned to the plant the
following day for his tools. While there the new engineer requested
him to assist in operation of machinery, which he did, and was in-
jured. Compensation was denied because, even if the new engineer
had implied authority to engage claimant to assist the employment was
casual.- Johnson vs. City of Albia, 212 N. W. 419 (Iowa Feb. 1927).
-
It is the duty of an injured employee to accept any medical or
surgical assistance available which offers reasonable hope for lessen-
ing the disability for which he is being compensated, provided such
assistance involves no real risk to life or health, nor is likely to cause
pain or inconvenience which reasonably prudent men could not be ex-
pected to undergo.-McCulloh & Co. vs. Restivo, 136 Atl. 54 (Md.
Jan. 1927).
-0
Construing the provision: "This act shall not be construed to
apply . . . persons whose employment . . . is casual, and not in the
usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his
employer", which is same as the N. D. law, compensation was denied
to claimant injured while re-shingling house for owner of small build-
ing which he rented out.-Sink vs. Pharoah, 212 N. W. 192 (Minn
Feb. 1927).
-0-
A ranch manager, suffering from dilation of the heart, previously
unknown to him and his friends, who, in the course of his employ-
ment, is required to go to high altitude on inspection trip, and who, by
reason of such exposure and the attendant overexertion resulting from
the rough contour of the country, breaks down and subsequently dies,
comes within the terms of the compensation act and the dependents are
entitled to aij award.- Knock vs. Industrial Commission, 2 ,3 Pac.
712 (Cal. Feb. 1927).
0
Claimant, the owner of certain premises, was directed by the city
to repair the sidewalk in front of such premises and to send bill to the
city. He went to work, charging all materials and the time of helpers
BAR BRIEFS
at cost and his own time by the hour, to the city. While so working
he was injured. Compensation was awarded upon the ground that
claimant had sustained the burden of proving that he was an employee
and not an independent contractor, the test set forth being "whether
the employer had the right to direct what should be done, and when
and how it should be done."-Morganelli vs. City of Derby, 135 Atl.
911 (Conn. Jan. 1927).
0
An accident resulting from injury for which master is liable under
the compensation act must be one resulting from the risk reasonably
incident to the employment; so where the janitor of a building was
killed by the collapse of a building in an earthquake, and the testimony
disclosed that buildings other than the one in which the janitor was
killed collapsed from the same cause, and that the particular building
was above the average in quality and of a higher grade than others,
the employee was not 'subjected to a peculiar risk by reason of his
employment, the injury resulted from an "Act of God" and is not
compensable.- London Guarantee & Accident Co. vs. Industrial Corn-
wission, 253 Pac. 323 (Cal. Jan. 1927).
0
An employee, engaged in executive work with no stated hours for
such work, for her own convenience maintaining offices at home as
well as at the plant of employer, generally used her own automobile
in traveling to and from her own office to the plant office, the em-
ployer contributing towards the maintenance of such automobile. On
a certain day an impending storm caused her to leave the auto at
home, and while walking on the street to take a street car she fell
and was injured. Compensation was denied upon the ground that an
executive is governed by the general rule that a person is not in the
course of employment in going to and from work. Four exceptions
to the rule are set out as follows: I. Where the employment requires
the employee to travel on the highway; 2. Where the employer con-
tracts to and does furnish transportation to and from work; 3. Where
the employee is subject to emergency calls; 4. Where the employee is
using the highway in doing something incidental to the employment,
with the knowledge and approval of the employer; but claimant was
held not to come within any of them.-Whitney vs. Hazard Lead
Works, 136 Atl. 1O5 (Conn. Jan. 1927.)
SIFTING APPLICANTS
The New York Court of Appeals held a public hearing in March
of 'this year, at which time it was considering the proposal to raise
the educational requirements for admission to the Bar in that state.
A goodly number of those who attended, probably a majority, favored
at least two years of college study before entrance into a law school,
it being urged that the moral qualities necessary to make a responsible
lawyer were more likely to be in evidence if the college requirements
were put into effect. Character and fitness examinations were also
suggested, and the following is from the report of Mr. Adam Fox,
made some time prior to, but presented at, the hearing:
"It is often suggested that some method be adopted for sifting
applicants before they are admitted to the law schools, for to reject
them at that stage would not be so drastic and serious as to reject
them three years later, after they have completed, often at great sacri-
